Research into supporting election apps at polling stations

Charl Tuwanakotta

On behalf of the Ministry of the Interior, PuraSec and Privacy Company conducted research into software used by municipalities to support the election process at polling stations. This research shows that some supporting applications could, in theory, influence the counting process. At the same time, there are currently no indications that this is actually happening in practice.

Research into supporting software

Although voting in the Netherlands is done with pencil and paper, various types of software are used in the election process. The best-known example is the Ondersteunende Software Verkiezingen (OSV, Supporting Software for Elections), which is managed by the Electoral Council. This software is used, among other things, to combine voting results at the municipal level and to determine the electoral quotient.

However, our research did not focus on OSV, but on other software that municipalities can use themselves at polling stations. Municipalities are free to decide whether to use such supporting software and often choose to do so in practice.

Different types of apps

The software examined consists of a variety of programmes and apps. Some applications mainly support organisational tasks related to polling stations. For example, local authorities can use tools to record the dietary requirements of polling station staff or to keep track of inventories of materials for polling stations.

In addition, there are apps that are more closely related to the voting process itself. An example of this is an iPad app that polling station staff use to check whether a voting pass appears in the Register of Invalid Voting Passes (ROS). This check can also be carried out manually, but that often takes more time. That is why many polling stations use a ROS check app.

Theoretical influence on the counting process

During the investigation, it emerged that the introduction of polling station apps could blur the distinction between the paper-based voting process and a digital process. As a result, such apps could, in theory, influence the counting process, for example.

However, we emphasise that there are currently no indications that this influence is actually occurring.

Recommendations

Based on our research, we make a number of recommendations to local authorities:

  • Raise awareness among local authorities and polling station staff. Data recorded in supporting apps should not be used for formal counting. It is important that all those involved are clear about the role these applications do and do not play in the election process.
  • Provide clear guidelines on the use of voting pass scanners. Municipalities should receive advice on how to organise the use of voting pass scanners in such a way as to limit potential risks.
  • Conduct privacy impact assessments when using applications. Municipalities must be aware of the importance of privacy impact assessments when using such applications in the electoral process.

View our official report here.

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